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Anderson v. State, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 51 (August 25, 2005)1 
CRIMINAL LAW – DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE 
Summary 
 
 In this case, the Court considered two issues related to DUI charges against 
appellant.  First, whether a jury may properly convict a defendant charged with driving 
under the influence of intoxicants based upon alternate theories of criminality.  Second, 
whether prosecutorial misconduct requires reversal of a conviction based upon 
conflicting evidence.     
 
The Court concluded with respect to the first issue that although jury verdicts 
must be unanimous, a jury need not be unanimous as to a particular theory of culpability 
for a single offense to sustain a conviction.  Thus, a unanimous general verdict of guilt 
will support a conviction so long as there is substantial evidence in support of one of the 
alternate theories of culpability.  As for the second issue, the Court held that prosecutorial 
misconduct requires reversal of a conviction based upon a plain error analysis.  
Disposition/Outcome 
 The Court reversed the conviction of felony DUI and remanded to the district 
court for a new trial. 
Factual and Procedural History 
 On May 12, 2001 NHP observed a bearded shirtless man driving a pickup with a 
young man in the passenger seat speeding at 89 miles per hour in a 70 mile-per-hour 
zone.  NHP noticed one of the pickup’s wheels touch the shoulder and after effecting a 
traffic stop noticed that the shirtless man, Anderson, emerged from the passenger-side 
door while Anderson’s 14-year-old son remained in the driver’s seat.  When the state 
trooper asked Anderson why he switched places with his son, Anderson first denied 
doing so and then said he was just being a “stupid sh--.”  The troopers smelled alcohol on 
Anderson and he failed field sobriety tests and a preliminary breath test.  Subsequent 
breath testing confirmed blood-alcohol levels in excess of the statutory minimums.   
The prosecution charged Anderson with felony DUI, third offense.  At trial the 
jury found Anderson guilty.  Anderson appeals. 
Discussion 
A. Reliability of the jury’s verdict 
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The State prosecuted Anderson on all three statutory theories for DUI criminal 
liability:  (1) operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and/or 
(2) operating a motor vehicle while having 0.10 percent or more by weight of alcohol in 
the blood, and/or (3) being found by measurement within 2 hours after driving or being in 
physical control of a vehicle to have 0.10 percent or more by weight of alcohol in the 
blood.2  The jury unanimously found Anderson guilty of all three theories. 
Anderson argues that the verdict is unreliable because the State presented no 
evidence in support of the second theory.  Moreover, there is no way of knowing whether 
the jury was unanimous as to any one theory.  The Supreme Court disagrees.   
Although NRS 175.481 requires unanimous verdicts, the Court has previously 
held that a jury need not be unanimous as to a particular theory of culpability for a single 
offense to sustain a conviction.3  In this case, however, adjudication of guilt was not 
dependent upon a general verdict based upon alternate theories of culpability.  Rather, the 
jury was given the task of separately determining each of the statutory theories of 
criminality.  Thus, it was necessary for the jury to issue a unanimous verdict as to one of 
the three theories.  Although the jury clearly erred in finding Anderson guilty under the 
second theory, it still issued a unanimous verdict as to the other two.  Because substantial 
evidence exists in the record supporting the jury’s findings on the remaining theories, this 
error with respect to the second theory was harmless. 
B. Prosecutorial misconduct 
The Court explained that the relevant inquiry to determine whether prosecutorial 
misconduct occurred is whether the prosecutor’s statements so infected the proceedings 
with unfairness as to result in a denial of due process.4  Factors in determining infection 
with unfairness include:  (1) A prosecutor may not vouch for the credibility of a witness, 
(2) accuse a witness of lying, (3) use a defendant’s post-arrest silence for impeachment 
purposes, and (4) refer to a defendant’s post-arrest silence in its case-in-chief.  These 
factors were met at trial when the prosecutor accused Anderson and his son of lying, used 
Anderson’s post-arrest silence against him and in the case-in-chief, advised the jury that 
it had a duty to convict Anderson, and by offering personal opinions as to the verity of 
witnesses. 
Reversal, however, is unnecessary if the prosecutor’s statements were harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  The Court further explained that the prosecutor’s statements 
are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the statements were merely passing in nature, 
or there is overwhelming evidence of guilt.  Although Anderson failed to object to these 
statements at trial, appellate review is not precluded because the prosecutor’s statements 
were plainly erroneous.  Furthermore, the statements compel reversal because they were 
not made in passing and the evidence of guilt was not overwhelming.  Anderson’s 
argument that it is virtually impossible to make a change of drivers at high speed, 
                                                 
2 NEV. REV. STAT. 484.379 (2004). 
3 Citing Evans v. State, 113 Nev. 885, 895-96, 944 P.2d 253, 260 (1997). 
4 Citing Thomas v. State, 120 Nev. 37, 47, 83 P.3d 818, 825 (2004). 
  
especially when the driver is highly intoxicated and the passenger underage and 
inexperienced, raises arguable reasonable doubt.   
Finally, the prosecutor’s statements changed the focus of the case to his personal 
views and away from the evidence, which prejudiced Anderson.  The Court concluded its 
discussion by admonishing the prosecutor for such misconduct and threatened state bar 
discipline for repeating this type of “adversarial rhetoric.”   
Conclusion 
 
 The Court concluded that the jury verdict is valid because the jury was unanimous 
as to two theories of culpability that are supported by substantial evidence.  However, the 
prosecutorial misconduct in this case warrants plain error review because it affected 
Anderson’s substantial rights.  Accordingly, the Court reversed Anderson’s conviction 
and remanded the matter to the district court for a new trial. 
 
